a) Manual cordon pricing may only be feasible where road network cordon crossings are few (such as Singapore, Mumbai, Lagos, Bangkok etc); the physical problems of locating and administering on a consistent, daily basis a large number of control points may be difficult to achieve although contracting out the entire scheme seems to offer a clear way forward;
b) Electronic pricing with some form of stored value-credit (as Singapore) in-vehicle offers efficiency and effectiveness as charges can be geared to traffic conditions and times of day[46] and a balance can be achieved between optimum use of road space and charges;
c) Electronic pricing raises operational-administrative issues in developing cities which could include:
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tracing scheme violators will be a problem in many cities as national, centralised, accessible vehicle registration records are not likely to be available. On-the-spot fines for violators may be the only enforcement policy possible and as noted above, this has serious implications for feasibility of cordon schemes in that road space is required to deal with offenders, there is the possibility of corruption arising from a direct fine system and the numbers of offenders and thus congestion induced may be so great that the benefits of the scheme are eroded; |
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electronic charging schemes requires a complex administrative set-up to install in-car equipment (it is believed to have taken Singapore over a year to fit all in-vehicle units although this is not the only electronic charging system), to sell smart cards or levy charges etc. Again, these problems are not insurmountable in more advanced cities such as Moscow or Sao Paulo but could be difficult, even if contracted out, in many less developed cities; |
9.11.12. Parallel measures - congestion pricing should be part of a comprehensive package of measures which would include:
a) Improvements in public transport quantity and quality must be part of an overall restraint policy; in particular, traffic congestion approaching the priced area is likely and public transport (bus) priority on street is necessary on the approaches
b) The disposition of revenues collected from road pricing should be made explicit to the public and is crucial to success and public acceptability; revenues from schemes should be earmarked for improvements to the transport system as a whole and to public transport in particular;
c) Land use controls to discourage prevent migration of activities (and congestion) to other locations
9.12.1. As travel demand is dependent on land use disposition, it should theoretically be possible to reduce overall demand for travel through control of land-use. Indeed, it can be argued that much of the increase in the use of cars is a direct result of policies which have permitted, even encouraged, the dispersion of major activity centres to the fringes of urban areas and beyond. Many of these locations are not readily accessible by public transport and, with concentration into larger units for retail, education, healthcare and recreation, few people live near enough to access them by foot or bicycle.
9.12.2. The need, at least, to curtail, if not reverse, some of these trends is recognised in most European cities[47] and new processes are sought to provide to facilitate access by public transport, bicycle and on foot. In particular development policies can be used to control the extent of parking in new developments. For example, in UK, apart from restrictions on absolute parking capacity, local authorities are empowered to permit development with an attached condition that a defined percentage of travellers must use public transport; development owners must close parking spaces or pay fines if that proportion is not reached. In Paris, for large companies, financial-tax benefits accrue if a proportion of employees use public transport and so on.
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