Urban Transport Strategy. Management in Developing Countries John A Cracknell, страница 84

9.11.4. It has been stated^[44] that a “good” road pricing system should include the following characteristics:

a)  User point of view

♦           User friendliness – easy to understand

♦           Transparent – charges evident before trips undertaken

♦       Anonymous – privacy of users assured ♦           Prepayment or post-payment possible;

b)  Traffic authority point of view

♦           Efficient – charges should reflect true user costs

♦           Flexible – responsiveness to demand, peak-off peak etc

♦           Reliable – chances of incorrect charges to users minimised

♦           Enforceable

♦           Secure – free from fraud

♦           Provide for occasional user

♦       Revenue-cost test – positive condition for “commercial viability” c) Society’s point of view ♦    Benefit-cost – positive

♦           Minimum implementation disruption

♦           Minimum environmental intrusion

♦           Provides for mixed traffic

♦            Modularity to integrate with other measures e.g. parking, public transport improvements

♦           Tolerant to culture of non-compliance with traffic regulations

♦           Perception of fairness

9.11.5. It is not proposed to discuss all the criteria for congestion pricing or how they may be

achieved in detail – that is not the function of this paper and a “Comparison of Road Use Charging Mechanisms” is presented in Table 5 of Hau’s paper (reference above as WPS 1071).  The current Review concentrates on issues involved in implementation of congestion pricing schemes.

9.11.6. Over 8 years ago, in his paper on road pricing, Hau (reference above as WPS 1071) notes over 100 references for papers, articles, evaluations and the like relating to various forms of congestion pricing schemes.  While it is undoubtedly the case that the reference library has increased since then, the paper reported that only about 6 congestion pricing schemes were in operation and even then some of these do not have “true” restraint as their main objectives but are aimed at revenue raising (e.g.

Trondheim).  The position on implementation is little different today.  However, there is a current up-surge in interest due to the opportunities offered by high technology for INV (in-vehicle units), AVI (automatic vehicle identification), smart card technology and the like.  Undoubtedly the real costs of such technology are reducing and reliability is increasing and thus “automatic” congestion pricing is becoming a practical and affordable technological possibility and Singapore introduced electronic road pricing in 1998.  Even with this trend, issues such as the practicality of tracing offenders through the vehicle licensing system, which in some developing countries is not well developed, means that manual enforcement systems will remain the only viable policy in the short term.

9.11.7. In addition to the transport rationale for congestion pricing, there is a strong poverty impact case in many developing cities.  Generally, it the rich who own and drive cars and thus (i) the direct costs of congestion charging are not borne by the poor and (ii) public transport improvements should be integral parts of a congestion pricing scheme and (iii) revenues from congestion pricing could be used to improve quantity and quality of public transport.

9.11.8. Congestion pricing raises revenues.  In some cities, this has been a primary rationale and "selling point" for a congestion pricing scheme (e.g. Trondheim).  It seems likely that congestion pricing can only be "sold" to system users if the revenues are retained in the transport system, particularly for the improvement of the public transport system. For a major city, the revenues can be large.  In London, it has been estimated that a charge of US$7.5 per day for cars and US$22.5 per day for commercial vehicles would generate net revenues (after scheme management) of US$750 million per year^[45].  This