c) roadspace reallocation to disadvantage car users explicitly and to encourage public transport use through re-allocation of road space to public transport (see discussion in Chapter 7) and/or to multiple occupancy vehicles. While the primary objective of bus priority schemes in many cities is to enhance public transport services, there is frequently a secondary objective of seeking to discourage car use. Positive discrimination against ‘inefficient’ use of roadspace by vehicles with only a driver is extensive in the USA through the use of ‘HOV’ (high occupancy vehicle) facilities in which road lanes are designated to vehicles with 2 or more commonly 3 occupants.
9.7.2. While the use of such measures may reduce traffic in the target areas (usually a city centre) they are unlikely to reduce demand overall, unless coupled with other measures such as parking policy. While physical means may be successful in managing demand to the extent that cities are made more pleasant (pedestrianisation) and transport is more efficient (reallocation of road space to public transport and high occupancy vehicles), such measures are unlikely to have a great impact on car use. Essentially, the measures create restraint-by-congestion. While this is unlikely to result in paralysing congestion,
the reactions of car drivers will be complex – times of journeys will change, patterns of journeys will change and in the long run, land uses will be affected. Demand management by physical means – pedestrianisation, bus priority, HOV etc – is likely to be a complement to, and part of, a comprehensive policy and not a stand alone restraint policy.
9.8.1.Vehicle ownership and use taxes are not primarily aimed at restraint. Taxes on vehicle ownership and use (through fuel taxes) are important sources of revenue for public finance and their basic purpose is not to rationalise the use of transport modes. These taxes have a high yield and can be argued to have a re-distributive effect (richer households have more cars, more expensive cars, drive more and consume more fuel and thus pay more tax than lower income households). Clearly if taxes are high enough, there will be some effect on use (see subsequent discussion on ownership charges and Singapore and on fuel prices) but in principle, such charges do not address specific congested urban areas nor specific congested times. They are "blunt instruments" and do not manage demand where and when it is most needed.
9.9.1. The economic rationale for congestion charging is that the users of motor vehicles do
not perceive, and do pay, the true user costs of using their vehicle, even when traffic flows reasonably freely. There is, therefore, a case for using fuel charges (taxation) to ensure that the generalised cost of car travel reflects more closely the costs of car use.
9.9.2. Fuel prices vary widely from country-to-country but are not related to purchasing power of the society in which they apply or to domestic oil production of a country nor to the need to manage car demand - prices are largely determined by political factors. The wide disparities of gasoline prices are demonstrated in a recent study43 and are summarised as follows:
Policy |
Typical Countries |
Price of gasoline in US Cents per litre |
“High fuel taxation” |
European Union44 (Germany, France, UK, Italy etc) and specific others (e.g. Hong Kong) |
78-136 |
“Medium fuel taxation” |
Tanzania, Malawi, Madagascar, etc |
47-74 |
“Low fuel taxation” |
Ethiopia, Ghana, China, USA etc |
28-36 |
“Subsidisation including oil producing” |
Turkmenistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia etc |
9-16 |
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