A related development is the advent of actionbased notions of strategy. In the new evolutionary and process models, strategy involves more than a static position in the marketplace (Inkpen and Choudhury, 1995), and includes paths, moves, and actions (Pettigrew, 1992). Models of strategic interaction (Chen, 1996), real options (e.g., Bowman and Hurrey, 1993), commitment (Ghemawat, 1991), and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) still see strategy as being subject to planning, but highlight its continuous and pathdependent nature. By highlighting the idea that firms need to conduct experiments and not only analysis and planning, recent approaches have further promoted a more active view of strategy (e.g., Miller and Chen, 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998).
Process models and designs have moved the focus from what determines strategy and performance to how they are determined (Mohr, 1982). The new models do not necessarily reject the idea of steady states and strategic positions but rather seek to explain firm success and failure by looking at historical developments, and observing the pace and path of change (Hodgson, 1993; Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). They examine how initial conditions, timing, managerial choices, decisive moments, learning, and path-dependent processes enable and constrain current states and in turn provide platforms for future developments (Doz, 1996; Mitchell, 1989; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998).
With the growing appreciation of interaction and reciprocal causation of key constructs, feedback loops have been added in each of the main research programs of the mechanistic perspective. They accounted for firm conduct and firm structure effects on industry structure (Caves et al., 1980; Caves, 1980; Porter, 1991), highlighted the effects of organization structure on strategy (Hall and Saias, 1980), and recognized the effects of strategy and environment on resources (Porter, 1991; Rumelt et al., 1994). These latter new linkages in particular have pointed to new connections across the original models. The focus on strategic (external) interaction is also the main feature of the game theoretical models in the new Industrial-Organization (I-O) economics (Tirole, 1989; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). Models admitting interaction view capabilities, competition, and performance as both affecting and being affected by strategy, and are less concerned with the differential contributions of resources and environment to performance (e.g., Henderson and Mitchell, 1997). Differences between firms are traceable not only to their contemporary conditions, but also to the history of interactions between them and with other actors (March, 1994).
Reciprocal causality has also penetrated the design model of the strategic management process. It is implicit in the notion of dynamic fit (Itami and Roehl, 1987). It is also evident in the dialectic view of formulation and implementation (Burgelman, 1983; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Finally, it is represented in the renewed interest in internal firm attributes, such as organization structure, culture, and decision processes, as important influences on, rather than derivatives of, strategy formulation (Barney and Zajac, 1994).
A final set of organic developments has helped to counteract the growing proliferation of alternative views and approaches to strategy, and to emulate earlier works that provided a more holistic picture of strategy (e.g., Chandler, 1962). In addition to the integration gained by the increased recognition of reciprocal causation, integrative works have offered more eclectic views of concepts and phenomena, linked previously disconnected constructs and levels of analysis, and attempted to further the bridging of fragmented models.
Examples of such integrative work are the development of comprehensive models of business phenomena such as acquisitions (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) or turnaround (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994). Also included is the work of configuration theorists (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1978), which extended earlier notions of alignment to show how environment, strategy, structure, and other organizational attributes coalesce into distinct and episodically changing archetypes. Finally, several works have explored new ways to merge behavioral and economic approaches (Barney and Ouchi, 1986), to bridge across multiple levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 1985), and to integrate prescriptive and descriptive models (e.g., Bowman and Hurrey, 1993; MacIntosh and MacLean,
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