Other studies have highlighted the role of vision and cognition, and of other cultural, social, and political influences in strategy formation (e.g., Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; Pettigrew, 1985). They emphasized the incremental nature of decision making, initially as a disjointed process (Lindblom, 1959), and subsequently as a more integrated one (Quinn, 1980). Quinn’s (1980) model particularly blended descriptive ideas of an incremental and nonlinear process with the logical and prescriptive marks of more rational models. Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983) added a view of strategy formation as dialectic involving rationalization and structuring by top management and strategic initiatives of lower levels in the organization (Noda and Bower, 1996).
A related branch of strategy inquiry has highlighted the significant role of strategic leadership in the strategic management process (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984). This stream of research has highlighted the role of the CEO, board, and top management in formulating and implementing strategies (e.g., McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). It served as a counterpart to the mechanistic and rational views of strategy making by highlighting human engagement and multiparty (e.g., board, consultants) interaction in these processes, and the critical role of strategic leaders in mediating the firm’s internal and external contexts.
A final and most significant development along these lines suggests that realized strategies can be a result of prior plans but can also be an emergent stream of actions recognized as a pattern after the fact (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Rather then being distinct processes as depicted in the design approach, formulation and action (i.e., implementation) are better viewed as constantly coevolving: following and affecting each other through a process of strategic learning and control. Good strategies can be formed and discovered by experimenting and observing the organization’s actions rather than by conducting formal analyses of strengths and opportunities (Mintzberg et al., 1998). In contexts where plans proved inadequate at times, such as in an increasingly turbulent environment, the concept of emergent strategy offered a viable alternative.
Ultimately, these various contributions uncovered a persistent tension in the field: strategy is an attempt to construct a rational and predictable world in the face of a reality that quite often resists it.
A second organic development stems not so much from dealing with topics largely ignored by the mechanistic approaches, but rather from a different orientation to process and time. It particularly includes the rise of new evolutionary models of the strategy process, and the growing interest in viewing strategy in dynamic and process terms (Porter, 1991; Melin, 1992; Academy of Management, 1997). Inherent to models of evolutionary processes is the idea that ‘history matters’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982; North, 1991; March, 1994; Arthur, 1995). Some of these models suggest that particular paths may influence outcomes examined at a particular time, and that history does not necessarily work efficiently to produce the optimal configurations and alignments suggested by the mechanistic views. In contrast to the traditional model of the environment (e.g., industry structure), more attention is given to market processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 1997). Static conceptions of resources have been augmented by models that highlight process and learning (e.g., McGrath, MacMillan, and Venkataraman, 1995; Teece et al., 1997). Similarly, studies of organizational structure have shifted the focus to its evolutionary nature (e.g., Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1995), and to organizing—the processual quality of organizational systems and participants (e.g., Weick, 1969; Pettigrew and Fenton, 2001).
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