Strategy without intelligence, intelligence without strategy, страница 7

It does not matter who provides intelligence as perspective, as long as it has an honest and incorrigible voice on the executive committee. In a way, this is the role of external consultants, but their conflict of interest is too big to provide true value. Companies must develop this capability in house, finding their own unique ways to overcome turf issues, as several powerful functions and executives stake a claim on “strategy” and its derivatives, and will not welcome an intrusion into their space. The price of not doing it right is strategy without intelligence, and its corollary, intelligence without strategy.

One way to do it well

Strategic intelligence is no panacea against leadership myopia or denial. In Competitive Blindspots (Gilad, 1994), I described the causes and effects of executives' reluctance to face or acknowledge reality, and the largely futile efforts of various schemes to overcome insularity, ego and other causes of misjudgment. In Early Warning (Gilad, 2003), I provided examples of failure of early warning despite ample signs. No process seems to work when top executives turn a blind eye to risks (or opportunities). This is just the nature of the beast, and in a free market, failures to face reality are eventually punished. In a protected market (with massive government intervention) it can take a bit longer. However, blind spots notwithstanding, most senior executives are sincere, hard-working people not overly filled with hubris.

With that perspective in mind, assuming companies are serious about creating some competitive intelligence capability with a goal of affecting executive thinking, one way to do it is to ensure minimal requirements: whoever takes on the role of voicing the strategic intelligence perspective must be a rising star in the company. Whether or not the task of intelligence is a full-time or part-time responsibility matters less than the fact that it is part of an executive development track. An alternative method is to create “crack teams” of young stars who pick apart “strategic initiatives” using strategy test kits such as war gaming or other confrontational methods to pry open implicit and explicit assumptions. It makes sense on several levels: companies should have a keen interest in exposing their future leaders to the broadest perspective on the industry; at the same time, it is also the only way to ensure that the “powers that are” would at least engage in a continuous dialogue about strategic risks and opportunities. Finally, as part of an executive development track, this arrangement ensures that the tenure of intelligence champions is never longer than two to three years. After that, the ability of any rising star to keep an objective view is markedly diminished.

We have encountered these stars in our Academy of Competitive Intelligence's classes over time. They stand out quickly. It is hard to miss them even early in their career. Their effect on their companies over time varies, depending on the companies' culture, the personality of the CEO or unit's President, and so forth, but they always end up in top management somewhere. Alas, there are too few of them, and too many companies that keep collecting mountains of useless competitor data instead. Bird-watching is a fine pastime, but it is hardly a substitute for strategic intelligence.